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Abstract: This paper considers a model of a rating agency with multiple clients.
Each client has a separate market (end-user of the rating); the only connection among
them is that the underlying qualities of the clients are correlated. In the benchmark
case of individual rating, the market for each client does not know the ratings for other
clients. In centralized rating, the agency rates all clients together and shares the rating
information among all markets. In decentralized rating, the ratings are again shared
among all markets, but each client is rated by a self-interested rater of the agency with no
access to the quality information of other clients. Both centralized rating and decentralized
rating weakly dominate individual rating for the agency. When the underlying qualities
are weakly correlated, centralized rating can dominate decentralized rating, but the reverse
holds when the qualities are strongly correlated.
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Consider a model of a rating agency with multiple clients. Each client has a separate
market, or end-user of the rating. The only link among the clients is that the underlying
qualities of the clients are correlated. Examples of the model include a stock brokerage
¯rm that deals with multiple stocks, a consumer electronics magazine that issues ratings
on multiple products, and an economics department that ranks its PhD graduates.
In individual rating, the market for each client does not know the ratings for other
clients. This model is then a replication of a simple signaling model with one sender
(the rating agency with a single client) and a receiver (the market), with the market only
interested in making the right inference about the client's underlying quality. We make
assumptions on the payo® function of the agency that imply that the incentive to exag-
gerate the quality always outweighs the reverse incentive to downplay it regardless of the
resulting belief of the market regarding the quality. This \single crossing" property allows
us to focus on the \in°ationary equilibrium," which is a semi-pooling equilibrium where
the client's quality is truthfully revealed whenever it is good and sometimes exaggerated
when it is bad. The benchmark model of individual rating can be interpreted as a model
of credibility, with the equilibrium perception of a good rating as the measure of credibil-
ity. The inability of the rating agency to commit to an honest rating policy dilutes the
meaning of a good rating without changing the meaning of the bad rating, and therefore
reduces the rating agency's ex ante payo®. A one-to-one correspondence exists between
equilibrium credibility of a good rating and equilibrium payo® of the agency. We ask the
following question in the rest of the paper: can the rating agency obtain a higher ex ante
payo® than in the in°ationary equilibrium in individual rating by improving credibility of
good ratings?
In \centralized rating," the agency rates all clients together and shares the rating
information among all markets. Each market can use the ratings of other clients as well
as its own client to make inference about the quality of the latter. Sharing the rating
information among all markets allows the agency to coordinate the ratings with a correlated
randomization between good and bad ratings across clients of bad quality. We consider the
1type of correlated randomizations in which there is a minimal number of good ratings issued
regardless of the true number of clients of good quality. If such coordination is credible
or incentive compatible, it results in a higher payo® to the agency than under individual
rating. We show that there exists an equilibrium that weakly dominates the benchmark
in°ationary equilibrium under individual rating for the agency. This coordinated ratings
equilibrium is unique when it strictly dominates the benchmark in°ationary equilibrium.
In \decentralized rating," the ratings are shared among all markets, as in centralized
rating, but each client is rated by a self-interested rater of the agency with no access to
the quality information of other clients. This means that only independent randomization
across clients of bad quality is possible, as in individual rating. However, unlike individual
rating, sharing of ratings information among all markets implies that the correlation across
the underlying client qualities makes it more di±cult for each rater to fool the market with
an exaggerated rating. This leads to a smaller equilibrium probability of in°ating ratings
compared to the benchmark in°ationary equilibrium under individual rating. Further, the
equilibrium payo® of the agency can be higher than in the in°ationary equilibrium under
individual rating.
Comparison between centralized rating and decentralized rating in terms of equilib-
rium credibility of good ratings and ex ante payo® to the agency depends on the degree of
correlation. When the underlying qualities are independently distributed, any in°ationary
equilibrium under decentralized rating is payo®-equivalent to the benchmark in°ationary
equilibrium under individual rating, as the ratings of other clients cannot discipline each
individual rater and thus there is no gain in credibility. In contrast, under centralized
rating the necessary and su±cient condition for an in°ationary equilibrium that strictly
dominates the benchmark equilibrium is typically satis¯ed under independence. Thus, cen-
tralized rating dominates decentralized rating for the agency under independence. With
correlation across the underlying qualities, there is less room to manipulate ratings un-
der both centralized rating and decentralized rating. When the underlying qualities are
almost perfectly correlated, under centralized rating there is no in°ationary equilibrium
that strictly dominates the benchmark equilibrium under individual rating, as the strong
correlation across client qualities severely reduces the credibility of coordinated rating. In
2contrast, under decentralized rating the discipline on credibility imposed by strong cor-
relation allows the construction of an in°ationary equilibrium that is arbitrarily close to
truth-telling. Thus, centralized rating is dominated by decentralized rating for the agency
with strong correlation.
Our comparison results regarding individual rating, centralized rating and decentral-
ized rating have strong implications to how a rating agency can gain credibility of its ratings
and improve its welfare. Since there exist in°ationary equilibria that weakly dominate the
benchmark under either centralized or decentralized rating schemes, it is always to the ad-
vantage of the agency to share ratings information among all markets it serves. Whether
the agency should share information about client qualities among its raters or commit to a
policy that restricts information access and preserves the raters' independent concerns for
career reputation, depends on the underlying correlation structure across client qualities.
Our results suggest that the agency should group together clients with weakly correlated
qualities and centralize their rating, but for clients with strongly correlated qualities the
agency should decentralize their rating among the raters.
It is interesting to interpret our comparison results between centralized rating and
decentralized rating in terms of di®erent market structures for rating agencies as opposed
to di®erent information structures for a single rating agency. The centralized rating scheme
naturally corresponds to the monopoly market structure, while the decentralized scheme
can be equivalently viewed as the competitive market structure. Although under the
decentralized scheme there is no direct competition among the agencies because the clients
have separate markets, the agencies indirectly compete for credibility as the ratings are
observed by all markets. Our results then suggest that the comparison between the two
market structures depends on the degree of correlation across the underlying states of
nature. The monopoly structure performs better due to an economy of scale when the
states are weakly correlated. When the states are strongly correlated, the competitive
structure does better because competing ratings constrain the incentive to in°ate and
improve the credibility of good ratings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of individual rating.
We introduce the out-of-equilibrium belief re¯nement used throughout of the paper, and
3characterize a unique in°ationary equilibrium that serves as the benchmark of compari-
son. In Section 3 we deal with centralized rating. This turns out to be a signaling model
with one-dimensional private information and multi-dimensional signals. We establish the
existence of an in°ationary equilibrium that weakly dominates the benchmark in°ationary
equilibrium of individual rating for the agency in terms of expected payo®. We provide
a necessary and su±cient condition for the existence of an equilibrium the strictly dom-
inates the benchmark in°ationary equilibrium, and show that the equilibrium is unique
when it exists. Section 4 presents the model of decentralized rating. We introduce a corre-
lation structure that accommodates possibilities of both positive and negative correlation
across client qualities in a multi-dimensional setting. Using the structure we show that
there exists an in°ationary equilibrium that weakly dominates the benchmark in°ationary
equilibrium of individual rating for the agency in terms of expected payo® under further
assumptions on the payo® functions of the agency. In Section 5 we study how the compar-
ison between centralized rating and decentralized rating depends on the correlation across
client qualities. Section 6 provides some remarks on related literature.
2. Individual Rating: A Signaling Model of Credibility
A rating agency deals with N clients. In our model the N sets of relationship between
each client i, i = 1;:::;N, and the corresponding market (end-user of the rating for the
client) are identical, so we will drop the subscript i until further notice. The underlying
quality of each client is either good (G) or bad (B); the rating for the client is either
good (g) or bad (b). Let q be the market's updated belief that the quality of the client is
good. The objective function of the market is to minimize the expectation of the squared
di®erence between a real-valued decision variable ± and the random variable which has a
binary distribution and is equal to ±G with probability q and ±B with probability 1 ¡ q.
The solution to the maximization problem is to set ± to q±G+(1¡q)±B. In many situations
the rating agency is not an impartial provider of information; it cares about the decision ±
taken by the end-user of its information. Since the market's response ± is a function of the
endogenous variable q, we can write the rating agency's payo® function from this client
4as U(S;s;q) for S = G;B and s = g;b. This general form of the agency's utility function
allows for any two-state, two-signal setup. In particular, a setup where there is a costly
action that the agency can use to signal the quality of the client, such as advertising, can
be restated in terms of our model by appropriately choosing the utility function U and
adding a free signal. The speci¯c preference function adopted here for the receiver (the
market) is meant to capture the idea that the client faces competitive bids based on the
agency's rating. This suppresses strategic responses of the receiver in our signaling model
and allows us to focus on the signaling incentives of the agency.
We assume that the derivative of U(S;s;q) with respect to q, Uq(S;s;q), exists for
each q 2 (0;1). This rules out situations where the market's response to the agency's
rating is discrete, for example, where the only choice of the market is whether or not to
acquire the client's service at some ¯xed wage. We further assume that regardless of the
underlying quality or the rating, the agency bene¯ts from a more favorable belief that the
state is G. This assumption can be motivated by the idea that U incorporates bene¯ts to
the client from an improved perception of the quality.
Assumption 1. Uq(S;s;q) exists and is positive for each S = G;B, s = g;b and q 2 (0;1).
Signaling games often have a multiplicity of equilibria. One way to minimize the
equilibrium selection issue is to ensure that if the agency weakly prefers g to b when the
quality is B, then it strictly prefers g to b in state G, and conversely, if the agency weakly
prefers b to g in state G, then it strictly prefers b to g when the quality is B. This condition
may be referred to as \single-crossing." It will be used to limit equilibrium signaling to
one form of misrepresentation, referred to as \in°ationary rating" (issuing a good rating
when the quality is bad), and to rule out \de°ation" (issuing a bad rating when the quality
is good). For the single-crossing result to be e®ective in eliminating unwanted equilibria,
we will need it to hold regardless of how di®erent ratings induce di®erent beliefs. That is,
we want
U(G;g;q) ¡ U(G;b;q0) > U(B;g;q) ¡ U(B;b;q0) (2:1)
for all q;q0 2 [0;1]. Condition (2.1) can be thought of as payo® complementarity between
the underlying quality S and the rating g, modi¯ed to suit the signaling model so that
5it holds whenever a switch of the underlying quality for the same rating does not a®ect
the belief q while a switch of the rating for the same quality generally will a®ect q. Note
that this condition is in fact stronger than we need for the purpose of the analysis; single-
crossing requires it to hold only when the right-hand-side is non-negative.
To deliver condition (2.1), consider the following set of assumptions on utility functions
U(S;s;q).
Assumption 2. Uq(G;g;q) > Uq(B;g;q) and Uq(G;b;q) < Uq(B;b;q) for any q 2 (0;1),
and
U(G;g;0) ¡ U(G;b;0) > U(B;g;0) ¡ U(B;b;0): (2:2)
Inequality (2.2) in the assumption is simply inequality (2.1) evaluated at q = q0 = 0.
It states that if the belief stays at the most pessimistic at 0 and is una®ected by the
ratings, then the agency bene¯ts more from a switch from signal b to signal g when the
quality is really G than when the quality is B. The two assumptions on the derivatives
of U require that with each rating s the agency bene¯t more from an improvement in the
belief q when the agency is telling the truth about the quality of the client. The ¯rst
one, Uq(G;g;q) > Uq(B;g;q), can be motivated by the agency's reputational concerns for
honesty, while the second one, Uq(G;b;q) < Uq(B;b;q), may be motivated by reputational
concerns for competence.1
Lemma 2.1. Assumptions 1 and 2 imply inequality (2.1).
Proof. Since Uq(G;g;q) > Uq(B;g;q),
U(G;g;q) ¡ U(B;g;q) ¸ U(G;g;0) ¡ U(B;g;0)
for any q. Similarly, since Uq(G;b;q) < Uq(B;b;q),
U(G;b;q0) ¡ U(B;b;q0) · U(G;b;0) ¡ U(B;b;0)
1 These two inequalities capture a form of complementarity between the state (the underlying quality of
the client) and the signal (the rating). As can be seen from the proof of the following lemma, the inequalities
are su±cient but not necessary for the single-crossing condition (2.1). Our analysis of individual rating and
decentralized rating goes through so long as (2.1) holds, but the two inequalities are used for equilibrium
construction in the case of centralized rating.
6for any q0. Condition (2.1) then follows from inequality (2.2). Q.E.D.
The next set of assumptions is made to further restrict the number of possible equi-
libria in order to bring out our main results more e®ectively. It implies that the agency
would not want to mislead the market when the client's quality is G provided that the
market belief is su±ciently favorable, while there exist favorable beliefs that will induce
the agency to issue an in°ationary rating when the quality is actually B.
Assumption 3. U(G;g;1) > U(G;b;1) and U(B;g;1) > U(B;b;0) > U(B;g;0).
In the remainder of this section, we consider individual rating, where the market for
each client has no access to ratings for other clients. Since the clients are exchangeable,
the model reduces to N identical signaling games involving the agency and the market.
Let ¼ be the market's prior belief that the underlying quality of the client is G. We adopt
the re¯nement concept of \Divinity" (Banks and Sobel, 1987). We refer to a sequential
equilibrium that passes this re¯nement test a \re¯ned" equilibrium. Since this re¯nement
is used throughout the paper, we drop the quali¯er and refer to a re¯ned equilibrium
simply as equilibrium.
Lemma 2.2. In the only candidate for an equilibrium, the agency gives g under quality G
and randomizes between g and b under quality B.
Proof. (i) We rule out any strategy in which Pr[s = b j S = G] > 0 and Pr[s = g j S =
B] > 0. In any such strategy, the agency weakly prefers g to b under B and weakly prefers
b to g under G. This contradicts Assumption 2 (inequality 2.1).
(ii) We rule out the pooling strategy in which Pr[s = b j S = G] = Pr[s = b j S = B] =
1. Under G, the equilibrium payo® is U(G;b;¼), which is smaller than U(G;g;q) if the out-
of-equilibrium belief q is su±ciently close to 1. If U(B;b;¼) > U(B;g;1), there is no belief q
that allows the deviating agency to recover its equilibrium payo®, so the pooling strategy
is immediately ruled out by the re¯nement. Suppose instead U(B;b;¼) · U(B;g;1).
By Assumption 2, if U(B;b;¼) · U(B;g;q) for some out of equilibrium belief q, then
U(G;b;¼) < U(G;g;q) and again the pooling strategy is ruled out by the re¯nement.
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G] > 0 and Pr[s = b j S = B] = 1. This does not directly contradict Assumption 2, but
we would have to have U(G;g;1) = U(G;b;q) for some q 2 (0;1). This is impossible under
Assumption 3 and Assumption 1.
(iv) The separating strategy in which Pr[s = g j S = G] = Pr[s = b j S = B] is ruled
out by U(B;g;1) > U(B;b;0) (Assumption 3). Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.2 allows both the semi-pooling equilibrium in which the agency gives b with
positive probability under B, and the pooling equilibrium in which the agency gives g with
probability 1 under B. We refer to these two types of equilibria as \in°ationary" equilibria
because the agency never gives a bad rating if the underlying quality of the client is G but
in°ates the rating with positive probability when the quality is B. When the in°ationary
equilibrium is semi-pooling, the support of the equilibrium strategy is the same as the
space of the signals, and the equilibrium beliefs corresponding to both ratings are de¯ned
according to the equilibrium signaling strategy through the Bayes Rule. We refer to this
type of in°ationary equilibrium as \full support in°ationary equilibrium." When there is a
pooling equilibrium, the signal b is never observed, and we refer to this type of equilibrium
as \non-full support in°ationary equilibrium."
To characterize the main result of this section, let q¤ be uniquely de¯ned by the
indi®erence condition under quality B,
U(B;g;q¤) = U(B;b;0): (2:3)
Proposition 2.3. There exists a unique equilibrium under individual rating. Further, the
unique equilibrium is full support in°ationary if q¤ > ¼, and non-full support in°ationary
if q¤ · ¼.
Proof. Necessary and su±cient equilibrium conditions for a full support in°ationary
equilibrium are (i) U(G;g;q) ¸ U(G;b;0) and (ii) U(B;g;q) = U(B;b;0) for some q =
¼=(¼+(1¡¼)p), where q is the equilibrium belief that the client's quality is G after rating
g is observed and p 2 (0;1) is the probability that the agency gives rating g under quality
8B. By inequality (2.1), condition (i) (with strict inequality) is implied by condition (ii).
Note that q is decreasing in p. Under Assumption 3, there is a unique p 2 (0;1) such
that condition (ii) holds if U(B;g;¼) < U(B;b;0), and thus in this case there is a unique
equilibrium that is full support in°ationary. If instead U(B;g;¼) ¸ U(B;b;0), then by
Assumption 2 we have U(G;g;¼) > U(G;b;0), so equilibrium conditions are satis¯ed if
we specify the out-of-equilibrium belief q to be 0. By Assumption 2, this speci¯cation of
q satis¯es the re¯nement, and thus we have a unique equilibrium that is non-full support
in°ationary. Q.E.D.
It is instructive to compare the ex ante welfare of the rating agency in an in°ation-
ary equilibrium to its welfare if it could commit to truthful ratings. In a full support
in°ationary equilibrium, the agency gets its complete information payo® U(B;b;0) under
quality B. However, under quality G its payo® is U(G;g;q), which is strictly lower than
the complete information payo® U(G;g;1). Thus, the ex ante payo® to the agency (before
the client's quality is revealed) is lower than what it would obtain if it could commit to
truthful revelation of the quality.2
The model of individual rating presented in this section may be interpreted as a model
of credibility. In equilibrium the market's perception of the quality of the client given a
good rating is q¤. This parameter quanti¯es equilibrium credibility in our model. From the
equilibrium indi®erence condition (2.3), we see that the value of q¤ depends on the function
U(B;g;¢) and the value of U(B;b;0). Thus, in our model the equilibrium credibility of
a good rating depends on the agency's incentive to in°ate and its reputational concern
for honesty when the actual quality is bad, and not on the agency's incentives when the
actual quality is good. Moreover, in a full support equilibrium, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the equilibrium credibility and the ex ante welfare of the agency.
An equilibrium with a greater credibility of the good rating corresponds to a higher ex
2 In a non-full support in°ationary equilibrium, compared with the respective complete information
payo®s, the agency's equilibrium payo® is lower under quality G but higher under quality B. The overall
welfare comparison is generally ambiguous. Additional assumptions on the utility function U are needed for
the comparison. For example, if both U(G;g;¢) and U(B;g;¢) are linear functions, then under Assumption
2, the equilibrium expected payo® can be shown to be lower than the expected complete information
payo®.
9ante payo® for the agency. These features facilitate our comparison of individual rating
with centralized and decentralized rating schemes.
3. Centralized Rating: A Model of Multi-dimensional Signals
This section considers centralized rating, in which the rating agency rates all N clients
together and shares the rating information among all markets.3 Although we assume that
each client has a separate market, centralized rating allows each market to use the ratings
of other clients as well as its own client to make inference about the quality of the latter.
This means that the agency can potentially coordinate all N ratings in an attempt to
in°uence market perception.
For the rating agency, the state is now an N-dimensional vector (S1;:::;SN) where
Si 2 fG;Bg for i = 1;:::;N. The signal is similarly an N-dimensional vector (s1;:::;sN)
where si 2 fg;bg for i = 1;:::;N. We assume that S1;:::;SN are exchangeable. For any
i = 1;:::;N, let q(m) be the market belief that Si = G when si = g and #fj : sj =
gg = m. Similarly, de¯ne ^ q(m) to be the market belief that Si = G when si = b and
#fj : sj = gg = m. Given the state, the agency chooses the signal vector (s1;:::;sN) to
maximize the sum of utilities
PN
i=1 U(Si;si;qi) where qi = q(m) if si = g and qi = ^ q(m) if
si = b for all m = #fj : sj = gg. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that #fj : Sj = Gg = n and #fj : sj = gg = m. For any
i = 1;:::;N, (i) if n · m, then Si = G implies si = g; and (ii) if n ¸ m, then Si = B
implies si = b.
Proof. (i) If #fj : Sj = G and sj = gg = n, the expected utility to the agency is
nU(G;g;q(m)) + (m ¡ n)U(B;g;q(m)) + (N ¡ m)U(B;b; ^ q(m)):
If instead #fj : Sj = G and sj = gg = n0 < n, the expected utility to the agency becomes
n0U(G;g;q(m))+(n¡n0)U(G;b; ^ q(m))+(m¡n0)U(B;g;q(m))+(N¡m¡n+n0)U(B;b; ^ q(m)):
3 The results in this section do not depend on the structure of correlation across client qualities. We
defer the introduction of the correlation structure to the next section on decentralized rating.
10The di®erence between the ¯rst and the second is (n ¡ n0) times
[U(G;g;q(m)) ¡ U(G;b; ^ q(m))] ¡ [U(B;g;q(m)) ¡ U(B;b; ^ q(m))];
which is positive by Assumption 2. A similar argument establishes (ii). Q.E.D.
While the agency may have an incentive to mislead the markets about the total
number of clients of good quality, Lemma 3.1 establishes that the agency has no incentive
to mislead the markets about the identity of clients of good quality. The same is true
about the identity of clients of bad quality when the agency de°ates the number of clients
of good quality. An implication of Lemma 3.1 is that we can reduce the state space to a
one-dimensional variable representing the number of clients of good quality.
Let ¼n be the prior probability that #fj : Sj = Gg = n for n = 0;:::;N. Given
Lemma 3.1, we can represent a signaling strategy of the agency as p(m;n), the probability
of giving m good ratings when the n clients are of good quality. Note that the signal
strategy is multi-dimensional because for each number n we need specify a vector of prob-
ability numbers p(m;n) for m = 0;:::;N. Obviously, we require
PN
m=0 p(m;n) = 1 for all















Let W(m;n) be the expected payo® to the agency when it chooses m good ratings when
the number of good quality clients is n. For m ¸ n, we have
W(m;n) = nU(G;g;q(m)) + (m ¡ n)U(B;g;q(m)) + (N ¡ m)U(B;b; ^ q(m)):
For m · n, we have
W(m;n) = mU(G;g;q(m)) + (n ¡ m)U(G;b; ^ q(m)) + (N ¡ n)U(B;b; ^ q(m)):
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of the agency. The ¯rst part of the lemma means that relative incentive to in°ate rather
than de°ate is stronger when the number of clients of good quality is greater. The second
part states that the incentive to in°ate to a more credible signal is stronger when the
number of clients of good quality is greater.
Lemma 3.2. (i) For any m · n < n0 · m0, if W(m0;n) ¸ W(m;n) then W(m0;n0) >
W(m;n0). (ii) For any n < n0 · m;m0 and q(m0) > q(m), if W(m0;n) ¸ W(m;n), then
W(m0;n0) > W(m;n0);
Proof. (i) The di®erence of di®erences [W(m0;n0) ¡ W(m;n0)] ¡ [W(m0;n) ¡ W(m;n)]
is equal to (n0 ¡ n) times
[U(G;g;q(m0)) ¡ U(G;b; ^ q(m))] ¡ [U(B;g;q(m0)) ¡ U(B;b; ^ q(m))];
which is positive by Assumption 2.
(ii) The di®erence between W(m0;n0)¡W(m;n0) and W(m0;n)¡W(m;n) is (n0 ¡n)
times
[U(G;g;q(m0)) ¡ U(G;g;q(m))] ¡ [U(B;g;q(m0)) ¡ U(B;g;q(m))];
which is positive by Assumption 2 since q(m0) > q(m). Q.E.D.
The ¯rst part of Lemma 3.2 implies that if in any equilibrium p(m0;n) > 0 for m0 > n,
then p(m;n0) = 0 for all n0 2 fn+1;:::;m0g and m · n. Conversely, if in any equilibrium
p(m;n0) > 0 for m < n0, then p(m0;n) = 0 for all n 2 fm;:::;n0 ¡ 1g and m0 ¸ n.
However, Lemma 3.2 does not imply that if W(m0;n) ¸ W(m;n) for some m0 > m
then W(m0;n0) > W(m;n0) for all n0 > n. In other words, the incentive to increase the
number of good ratings is not necessarily single-crossing in the number of good quality
clients. Indeed, what satis¯es single-crossing is the incentive to in°ate as opposed to
de°ate. Similarly the second part of Lemma 3.2 is not a single-crossing condition either,
because it requires restrictions on the endogenous variables q. Finally, we note that for the
second part of Lemma 3.2 to apply, we only need a comparison between q(m) and q(m0),
not between m and m0.
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remainder of this section we focus on a particular class of in°ationary equilibria, called
\threshold in°ationary equilibrium." An in°ationary equilibrium is such that p(m;n) = 0
for all n and for all m < n. We have the following de¯nition.
Definition 1. A threshold in°ationary equilibrium (TIE) is an equilibrium in which there
exists l 2 f0;1;:::;Ng such that
PN
n=0 p(m;n) = 0 for all m < l and
PN
n=0 p(m;n) > 0
for all m ¸ l.
A TIE with threshold l = 0 has full support, with ^ q(m) = 0 for all m. This equilibrium
is payo®-equivalent to the full support in°ationary equilibrium under individual rating, as
the following lemma shows. Recall that the parameter q¤ is given by equation (2.3).
Lemma 3.3. In any TIE with threshold l = 0, we have q(m) = q¤ for all m = 1;:::;N.
Proof. By de¯nition, we have p(0;0) > 0. Next, note that if q(m) > q¤ for any m, then
W(m;0) > W(0;0), contradicting p(0;0) > 0. Thus, q(m) · q¤. To show that q(m) = q¤
for all m, let m be the smallest m such that q(m) < q¤. Then, W(n;n) > W(m;n) for all
n < m. Hence, q(m) = 1, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
By sharing ratings information among all markets, the agency can make use of a
larger strategy space: instead of independent randomization as in individual rating, the
agency can correlate the randomizations across clients of bad quality. However, as shown
in the above lemma, centralized rating is equivalent to individual rating in a full support
in°ationary equilibrium. Although each market can use the ratings of other clients as well
as its own client to make inference about the quality of the latter, the rating agency gains
no credibility relative to individual rating. In any full support in°ationary equilibrium,
with n clients of good quality, the agency is indi®erent between issuing n and more good
ratings. These indi®erence conditions reduce centralized rating to individual rating in
terms of payo® to the agency.
4 If the payo® functions U(S;s;q) are linear in q, we can use mild, additional assumptions on U(S;s;q)
across S and s to show that there is no de°ation in equilibrium.
13Next, we consider non-full support in°ationary equilibrium. The following proposition
provides a characterization of any TIE with threshold l. The support of the signaling
strategy in any such equilibrium, de¯ned as fm :
PN
n=0 p(m;n) > 0g, is fl;:::;Ng.
Lemma 3.4. In any TIE with threshold l, either q(l) = ::: = q(N) = q¤ or q(l) > ::: >
q(N) > q¤.
Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
Thus, in any TIE, the credibility of a good rating declines with the total number of
good ratings issued, but is always more credible than that in the benchmark equilibrium
under individual rating. While for each l > 0, there will generally be many TIE's with
q(l) = q¤, the expected payo® to the agency is the same across all equilibria and equal
to the payo® in full support in°ationary equilibria. For the remainder of this section, we
focus on TIE's with q(l) > q¤, referred to as \strict" TIE's. To understand the welfare
properties of these equilibria, we ¯rst provide a characterization of equilibrium strategies.
To this end, we de¯ne
Tn = fm : p(m;n) > 0g
for each n, and let tn represent an element of the set Tn. Thus the rating agency issues tn
good reports with positive probability when n clients are of good quality.
Lemma 3.5. In any strict TIE, (i) Tl 3 l; (ii) Tn = fng all n > l; (iii) T0 [ ::: [ Tl =
fl;:::;Ng; and (iv) minTn ¸ maxTn+1 for all n < l.
Proof. Suppose p(m;n) > 0 for some m > n ¸ l. By optimality we have W(m;n) ¡
W(n;n) ¸ 0: Since q(n) > q(m) by Lemma 3.4, Lemma 3.2 implies that W(m;n0) ¡
W(n;n0) > 0 and hence p(n;n0) = 0 for all n0 < n. By De¯nition 1 we have p(n;n) > 0.
This establishes (i) if n = l. If n > l, we have q(n) = 1, contradicting Lemma 3.4.
Thus p(n;n) = 1 for all n > l, establishing (ii). This claim immediately leads to (iii),
because if m 62 T0 [ ::: [ Tl for some m between l and N, then q(m) = 1, contradicting
Lemma 3.4. To prove (iv), note that by optimality W(minTn;n) ¸ W(m;n) for all
m ¸ minTn. Then, from Lemma 3.2 we have W(minTm;n0) > W(m;n0) for all n0 such
that n < n0 · l · minTn. Hence p(m;n0) = 0, and maxTn0 · minTn: Q.E.D.
14To complete the description of a TIE, we need to specify out-of-equilibriums beliefs
q(m) and ^ q(m) for m < l. The following result establishes that there is a unique set of
speci¯cations of out-of-equilibrium beliefs that satisfy the re¯nement.
Lemma 3.6. In any strict TIE, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs are given by q(m) = 1 and
^ q(m) = 0 for all m < l.
Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
To state and prove the main result of this section, we use the above characterization
of TIE's to derive necessary and su±cient equilibrium conditions. Fix a strict TIE with
threshold l. Consider ¯rst the incentives to deviate to an out-of-equilibrium signal m < l.
By Lemma 3.6, the most pro¯table deviation among the out-of-equilibrium signals is to
issue l ¡ 1 good ratings. If l 2 Tl¡1, then a necessary equilibrium condition is
W(l ¡ 1;l ¡ 1) · W(l;l ¡ 1): (3:2)
By Lemma 3.2, the above condition is su±cient to imply that p(l¡1;n) = 0 for all n < l¡1
and for n = l. Further, since for all n > l,
W(l;n) ¡ W(l ¡ 1;n) = W(l;l) ¡ W(l ¡ 1;l);
condition (3.2) is also su±cient to rule out any deviation to out-of-equilibrium signals for
n > l. If l 62 Tl¡1, then by Lemma 3.5 we have q(l) = 1, which implies that condition
(3.2) is trivially satis¯ed and that p(m;n) = 0 for all m < l and all n. Next, for deviations
among the signals that are chosen with positive probability in equilibrium, the necessary
and su±cient equilibrium conditions can be derived recursively, starting from n = l. By
Lemma 3.5, for any tl 2 Tl we need
W(l;l) = W(tl;l): (3:3)
Further, either maxTl +1 = minTl¡1 or maxTl = minTl¡1. In the ¯rst case, we also need
W(maxTl;l) ¸ W(maxTl + 1;l); (3:4)
15and
W(minTl¡1 ¡ 1;l ¡ 1) · W(minTl¡1;l ¡ 1): (3:5)
By Lemma 3.2, in the second case (3.4) will be implied by W(minTl¡1;l¡1) ¸ W(minTl¡1+
1;l ¡ 1) while (3.5) is implied by W(maxTl ¡ 1;l) · W(maxTl;l). In either case, we can
then move on to write down the counterpart for (3.3) for n = l¡1, and so on for all n · l.
Using Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.5, we can easily verify that conditions (3.3), (3.4) and
(3.5) together are su±cient to ensure that no pro¯table deviations exist for n · l among
the signals m ¸ l. Finally, p(n;n) = 1 for any n > l if conditions (3.3) through (3.5) are
satis¯ed. Thus, it is both necessary and su±cient for the equilibrium that we can ¯nd
values of p(m;n) for m ¸ l and n · l to satisfy these equilibrium conditions.
In the proof of the next proposition we construct an N-step, iterative algorithm. For
each l > 0, the l-th step of the algorithm covers all possible strict TIE's. For each such
equilibrium, the values of p(m;n) for m ¸ l and n · l are recursively assigned, starting
from p(m;l) for m = l;:::;N, such that all the equilibrium conditions are satis¯ed except
for that the sum of probabilities p(n;0) for n = 0;:::;N equals 1. We cover all strict
TIE's with threshold l by continuously adjusting a \path variable" Pl, which records the
recursive assignments of p(m;n) for m ¸ l and n · l. Any point along the algorithm
results in a unique value for the sum
PN
n=0 p(n;0). At the start of the algorithm, the sum
PN
n=0 p(n;0) has a value strictly greater than 1 by construction. If the value of ¾ exceeds
1 at the end of the last step of the algorithm, we have a TIE with l = N. Along the
algorithm in each step l, l = 0;:::;N ¡ 1, the sum
PN
n=0 p(n;0) continuously decreases,
as we continuously adjust the path variable. If the sum
PN
n=0 p(n;0) is equal to 1 within
the step l, we can construct a strict TIE with threshold l. Since the sum
PN
n=0 p(n;0) is
a continuous function, the algorithm establishes the existence of a TIE under centralized
rating. Moreover, every strict TIE corresponds to a distinct value of the path variable in the
algorithm where the sum
PN
n=0 p(n;0) equals 1. We establish that the sum
PN
n=0 p(n;0)
is monotonically decreasing along the algorithm, and thus we have at most one equilibrium
with l > 0 and q(l) > q¤.
Proposition 3.7. A TIE exists under centralized rating. Further, a unique strict TIE
exists if and only if q¤ < 1 ¡ ¼0.
16Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
The necessary and su±cient condition for the existence of a unique strict TIE is rather
weak. Unless client qualities are strongly positively correlated, the probability ¼0 that no
client is of good quality will be small, and the condition in the proposition will be satis¯ed.
Also, if client qualities are independently distributed, the condition is satis¯ed as long as
N is not too small.
According to Proposition 3.7, there is at most one TIE that dominates the benchmark
full support in°ationary equilibrium with belief q¤ under individual rating. However, there
are typically multiple TIE's with l = 0 and q(m) = q¤.5 This is because the agency is
always indi®erent between truthfully revealing the number of good quality clients and
in°ating that number. Full support TIE's with l = 0 and q(m) = q¤ can also coexist with
a strict TIE. For example, consider the model with N = 2, ¼0 = ¼2 = 1
2½ and ¼1 = 1 ¡ ½
for some ½ 2 (0;1), and q¤ > 1
2. We can show that there exists a full support TIE with
p(1;1) = 1 if and only if ½ ¸ 2(1¡q¤), while there is a full support TIE with p(2;1) > 0 if
and only if ½ ¸ 2(1 ¡ q¤)(2q¤ ¡ 1)=q¤. Further, the necessary and su±cient condition for
a strict TIE identi¯ed in Proposition 3.7 becomes ½ < 2(1 ¡ q¤). Since q¤ > 1
2, there is no
TIE with l = 2 in this model. Thus, for ½ in the interval between 2(1¡q¤)(2q¤¡1)=q¤ and
2(1 ¡ q¤), there are three TIE's, two of which are full support equilibria that are payo®-
equivalent to the benchmark equilibrium with q¤ under individual rating. The agency's
welfare is higher in the TIE with threshold l = 1 than in the two TIE's with threshold
l = 0.
4. Decentralized Rating: A Model of Competing Signals
In decentralized rating, rating information is shared among all markets, as in centralized
rating, but each client is rated by a self-interested rater of the agency with no access to the
quality information of other clients. In terms of strategy space, decentralized rating is the
5 The algorithm in the proof of Proposition 3.7 considers just one particular kind of full support TIE,
with l = 0 and p(n;n) = 1 for all n > 1.
17same as individual rating, as only independent randomization across clients is feasible. If
the underlying client qualities are independently distributed, decentralized rating produces
identical equilibrium outcome as in individual rating. However, since ratings information
is shared among all markets, when the underlying qualities are correlated, each market
can use the other ratings to make inference about the quality of its own client. In this
section we construct an in°ationary equilibrium under decentralized rating, and in next
section we show that with correlated qualities ratings in a decentralized scheme can gain
in credibility and therefore the agency is better o® relative to individual rating.
Unlike the case of centralized rating, the analysis of decentralized rating requires a
model of quality correlation across the clients. To accomplish this, de¯ne a random variable
Xi, i = 1;:::;N, such that Xi = 1 if Si = G and Xi = 0 if Si = B. Let f(X1;:::;XN)
represent the joint probability mass function of the random vector X = (X1;:::;XN).
Definition 2. We say that X is multivariate totally positive of order 2 (MTP2) if, for all
x;y 2 f0;1gN,
f(x _ y)f(x ^ y) ¸ f(x)f(y);
where x _ y = (maxfx1;y1g;:::;maxfxN;yNg); x ^ y = (minfx1;y1g;:::;minfxN;yNg).
We say that X is multivariate reverse rule of order 2 (MRR2) if the above inequality is
reversed.
The de¯nition of MTP2 is the same as log-supermodularity, also referred to as a±l-
iation. It is a commonly used concept of positive dependence among random variables
used in the statistics literature (see, for example, Joe, 1997) and in the auction literature
(see, for example, Milgrom and Weber, 1982). Similarly, MRR2 can be used to capture
the idea of negative dependence among random variables. These dependence concepts are
stronger than the notion of \regression dependence" used by Lehmann (1966). We will
use the following result (for proof, see Karlin and Rinott, 1980). For each i = 1;:::;N, let
X¡i = (X1;:::;Xi¡1;Xi+1;:::;XN).
Fact 1. If X is MTP2, then for any x 2 f0;1gN¡1, Pr[X¡i ¸ x j Xi = xi] is increasing in
xi. If X is MRR2, then Pr[X¡i ¸ x j Xi = xi] is decreasing in xi.
18Since in our model (S1;:::;SN) are exchangeable, for any two realizations x and x0
of X such that
PN
i=1(xi ¡ x0
i) = 0, we have f(x) = f(x0). Let fn be the probability mass
of x such that
PN
i=1 xi = n. The following result is also useful. (The proof follows easily
from the de¯nition of MTP2 and MRR2.)
Fact 2. If X is MTP2, then for any n;n0 = 1;:::;N such that n < n0,
fnfn0 ¸ fn+mfn0¡m
for all m = 1;:::;n0 ¡ n ¡ 1. The inequality is reversed if X is MRR2.





























We focus on symmetric in°ationary equilibria (SIE) in which for each i = 1;:::;N, the
common signaling strategy satis¯es Pr[si = g j Si = G] = 1 and Pr[si = g j Si = B] = p
for some p 2 [0;1].6
Fix some i = 1;:::;N. For each m = 1;:::;N, let rG(m) be the probability of a total
number m of good ratings conditional on Si = G and si = g:
rG(m) = Pr[#fj : sj = gg = m j Si = G;si = g];
with rG(0) = 0. Similarly, let
rB(m) = Pr[#fj : sj = gg = m j Si = B;si = g];
with rB(0) = 0. Intuitively, for any ¯xed p, under MTP2 each individual rater expects
to ¯nd more good ratings when the quality of his own client is good than when it is bad,
while the reverse is true under MRR2. This idea is formalized in the following lemma.
6 In the proof of Proposition 4.3 below, we use Assumption 2 to establish that the indi®erence condition
between g and b under B is su±cient to imply truth telling under G. But this result presumes the
signaling structure of SIE. The single crossing condition of Assumption 2 is generally insu±cient to rule
out de°ationary strategies.
19Lemma 4.1. In any SIE, frG(m)g ¯rst order stochastic dominates frB(m)g under MTP2;
the reverse is true under MRR2.





n ¯(N ¡ n;m ¡ n;p);
where ¼G
n is the probability of a total number n of clients of good quality conditional
Si = G, de¯ned as
¼G
n = Pr[#fj : Sj = Gg = n j Si = G];
with ¼G
0 = 0, and ¯(t;k;p) is the probability of having k successes out of t Bernoulli trials












n ¯(N ¡ n ¡ 1;m ¡ n ¡ 1;p);
where ¼B
n is de¯ned by
¼B
n = Pr[#fj : Sj = Gg = n j Si = B]
with ¼B
N = 0. For each m = 1;:::;N, de¯ne RG(m) =
Pm
k=0 rG(k) and RB(m) =
Pm
k=0 rG(k). Then, letting
Bn(m) =
(Pm¡n
k=0 ¯(N ¡ n;k;p) if n · m,
0 otherwise.
we have RG(m) =
PN
n=1 ¼G




A direct probability argument involving independent Bernoulli trials establishes that
Bn(m) = Bn+1(m) + ¯(N ¡ n ¡ 1;m ¡ n;p)(1 ¡ p)
for n < m, and so Bn(m) > Bn+1(m). For n ¸ m, it is trivially true that Bn(m) ¸
Bn+1(m). Hence Bn(m) is decreasing in n for all m. Fact 1 implies that f¼G
n g ¯rst-
order stochastically dominates f¼B
n¡1g under MTP2, and the reverse is true under MRR2.
20It follows that RG(m) · RB(m) under MTP2, and the reverse inequality holds under
MRR2. Q.E.D.





n=1 ¼n¯(N ¡ n;m ¡ n;p)n
Pm
n=0 ¼n¯(N ¡ n;m ¡ n;p)
; (4:1)
so long as the denominator is strictly positive, which happens if p < 1. We refer to an SIE
with p < 1 as a full support SIE.
Lemma 4.2. In any full support SIE, q(m) is increasing in m under MTP2 and decreasing
under MRR2.
Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
The above result is quite intuitive. For any probability of in°ation, the credibility
of a good rating is increasing in the total number m of good ratings under MTP2, and
decreasing in m under MRR2. We are now ready to use Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 to
establish existence of an SIE. Note that in any SIE, ^ q(m) = 0 for all m = 0;:::;N ¡ 1.
Proposition 4.3. There exists an SIE under decentralized rating. Further, if ¼ < q¤,
there is a full support SIE.
Proof. A necessary and su±cient condition for the existence of a full support SIE is




and (ii) si = g and si = b yield the same expected payo® if Si = B,
N X
m=1
rB(m)U(B;g;q(m)) = U(B;b;0): (4:2)
Under MTP2, Lemma 4.1 states that frG(m)g ¯rst-order stochastic dominates frB(m)g,







21It follows from Assumption 2 that condition (ii) implies condition (i). Under MRR2,
frB(m)g ¯rst-order stochastic dominates frG(m)g while q(m) is decreasing m, so again
condition (ii) implies condition (i) by Assumption 2. Consider the indi®erence condition




when p = 0. When p = 1, we have q(N) =
P
n ¼nn=N. Under Assumption 2, the
re¯nement implies that the out-of-equilibrium belief ^ q(N ¡ 1) is equal to 0. Thus, if
U(B;g;¼) < U(B;b;0), or equivalently ¼ < q¤, then by the intermediate value theorem
there exists p 2 (0;1) such that the equilibrium condition (ii) is satis¯ed, and hence there
is a full support SIE. Q.E.D.
Note that the condition for the existence of a full support SIE is identical to the con-
dition for the existence of the unique full support in°ationary equilibrium under individual
rating. If ¼ ¸ q¤, we have an SIE with p = 1, and the out-of-equilibrium belief is given by
^ q(N¡1) = 0. When S1;:::;SN are independently distributed, we have fn = ¼n(1¡¼)N¡n





n=1(¼=(1 ¡ ¼)p)n(1=((m ¡ n)!(n ¡ 1)!))
Pm
n=0(¼=(1 ¡ ¼)p)n(1=((m ¡ n)!n!)
=
¼
¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)p
;
Thus, under independence, decentralized rating reduces to individual rating of Section 2.
In general, multiple full support SIE's may occur. For example, in the model of N = 2,
¼0 = ¼2 = 1
2½ and ¼1 = 1 ¡ ½ for some ½ 2 (0;1), and q¤ > 1
2, the indi®erence condition is
given by
V (B;g) = rB(2)U(B;g;q(2)) + (1 ¡ rB(2))U(B;g;q(1)) = U(B;b;0); (4:3)
where
rB(2) = 1 ¡ ½ + ½p;
q(2) =
½ + (1 ¡ ½)p
½ + 2(1 ¡ ½)p + ½p2;
q(1) =
1 ¡ ½
1 ¡ ½ + ½p
:
22It is straightforward to show that q(2) and q(1) are decreasing functions of p. Further,
q(2) > q(1) if ½ > 1
2 and the reverse is true if ½ < 1
2. Since rB(2) increases with p, when
½ < 1
2, we have that V (B;g) monotonically decreases with p. Thus, there is a unique
equilibrium with negative correlation. When ½ is su±ciently close to 1, however, the left-
hand-side can increase for some range of values of p, and multiple solutions to (4.3) may
exist.
5. Comparing Rating Schemes: Credibility and Welfare
Comparison between centralized rating and decentralized rating in terms of equilibrium
credibility of good ratings and ex ante payo®s to the agency generally depends on the
underlying correlation structure. In Proposition 3.7, we have established that there al-
ways exists a TIE under centralized rating that does at least as well as individual rating.
Moreover, when q¤ < 1 ¡ ¼0, there is a unique TIE that does strictly better than the full
support in°ationary equilibrium under individual rating. This condition is rather weak,
and is easily satis¯ed when the qualities are independently distributed, as long as N is
not too small. In contrast, with independently distributed qualities, the unique SIE under
decentralized rating is payo®-equivalent to the full support in°ationary equilibrium under
individual rating. Thus, we expect centralized rating to dominate decentralized rating for
the agency when there is weak correlation among the qualities.
Centralized rating dominates individual rating because the agency can bene¯t from
correlated randomization of ratings on bad quality clients. To understand the advantage
from the coordination, note that individual rating is formally equivalent to centralized
rating with no access to ratings information of other clients for the market of each client.
The semi-pooling signaling strategy under individual rating imposes a separate indi®erence
condition between the good rating and the bad rating for each client. By coordinating
the ratings for all clients, the agency can relax some of the indi®erence conditions. In
particular, in a strict TIE, indi®erence conditions involving a total number m of bad
ratings less than l are not satis¯ed. The characterization of such equilibrium in Section 3
makes it clear that these indi®erence conditions can be credibly relaxed under centralized
rating.
23The next set of results shows that both equilibrium credibility of good ratings and ex
ante payo® to the agency under decentralized rating improve relative to the benchmark
of individual rating when the qualities are correlated. Unlike the above discussion about
centralized rating, comparison of credibility between decentralized rating and individual
rating requires a precise de¯nition of equilibrium credibility of good ratings. For any p,







¯(N ¡ n;m ¡ n;p)q(m): (5:1)
The above may be thought of as an average measure of credibility of good ratings under
decentralized rating, as the credibility of a single given good rating depends on the total
number of good ratings. Under individual rating, the same expression (5.1) applies, but
q(m) is constant because the markets are separate. Since
PN
m=1 ¯(N ¡ n;m ¡ n;p) = 1,
if q(m) is constant and equal to q, then (5.1) reduces to q. Thus, the above de¯nition
of credibility is consistent with the de¯nition given in Section 2. Further, if we replace
¯(N ¡n;m¡n;p) with p(m;n) in (5.1), we have a measure of credibility under centralized
rating.7 It follows that for any strict TIE, the equilibrium credibility is greater than q¤,
the equilibrium credibility in the benchmark full-support in°ationary equilibrium under
individual rating. To make comparison of equilibrium credibility between decentralized
rating and individual rating, we need the following preliminary result. Recall that under
individual rating, the market's belief upon observing g is giving by ¼=(¼ +(1¡¼)p) if p is
the probability that rating g is issued under quality B.
Lemma 5.1. Under decentralized rating,
PN
m=1 rB(m)q(m) · ¼=(¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)p) and
PN
m=1 rG(m)q(m) ¸ ¼=(¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)p) for any p < 1.


















7 It turns out that the de¯nition (5.1) of credibility corresponds one-to-one with the average expected
loss of the N markets. With the quadratic loss function given in Section 2, the average expected loss under
individual, centralized, decentralized rating schemes is (±G ¡ ±B)2¼(1 ¡ Q), where Q is given by (5.1) for
the corresponding scheme.






















































D(m) = N(¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)p):
































The lemma follows immediately. Q.E.D.
From the proof of Lemma 5.1 we can see that the equilibrium credibility under decen-
tralized rating, as de¯ned by (5.1), is precisely
PN
m=1 rG(m)q(m). That is, the equilibrium
25credibility of a good rating is equal to the average market perception of a good rating ex-
pected by a rater with a client of good quality. Thus, Lemma 5.1 directly implies that
under either MTP2 or MRR2, the equilibrium credibility is greater under decentralized
rating than under individual rating.
Lemma 5.1 also illustrates the idea that in our model of credibility correlation across
client qualities imposes a discipline on incentives to in°ate by making it harder for each indi-
vidual rater to fool its own market. This is represented by the result of
PN
m=1 rB(m)q(m) ·
¼=(¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)p). It immediately leads to the following comparison between equilibrium
in°ation under decentralized rating and under individual rating. Note that by Proposition
2.3, there is a unique equilibrium under individual rating and it involves in°ation.
Proposition 5.2. If U(B;g;q) is weakly concave in q, then at any full support SIE in
decentralized rating, the equilibrium probability of in°ation is lower than the full support
equilibrium probability of in°ation under individual rating.




By concavity of U and Lemma 5.1, we have
U(B;g;¼=(¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)p)) ¸ U(B;b;0):
The proposition follows immediately from the equilibrium condition under individual rating
(equation 2.3). Q.E.D.
Clearly, concavity of the payo® function U(B;g;¢) is not necessary for the above result.
Proposition 5.2 holds so long as the function is not too convex. A stronger result regarding
how correlation a®ects the equilibrium extent of rating in°ation than Proposition 5.2 is
possible if one imposes more structure on the correlation structure than MTP2 or MRR2.
Consider for example the model of N = 2, ¼0 = ¼2 = 1
2½ and ¼1 = 1¡½ for some ½ 2 (0;1),
and q¤ > 1
2. The critical indi®erence condition is V (B;g) = U(B;b;0), or equation (4.3).
We note that @V (B;g)=@p < 0 when evaluated at equilibrium, either when the equilibrium
26is unique, or when there are multiple equilibria and the equilibrium is maximal or minimal
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1994). We can show that if U(B;g;q) is concave in q, then at any
full support SIE with @V (B;g)=@p < 0, an increase in ½ for ½ > 1
2 or a decrease in ½ for
½ < 1
2 reduces the equilibrium probability of ratings in°ation.
For welfare comparison between decentralized rating and individual rating under either
MTP2 or MRR2, we say that U(B;g;¢) is \more concave" than U(G;g;¢) if there is a weakly
concave function H such that U(B;g;q) = H(U(G;g;q)). We have the following result.
Proposition 5.3. Suppose U(B;g;q) is more concave in q than U(G;g;q). Then, the
agency's payo® in a full support SIE under decentralized rating is higher than the full
support in°ationary equilibrium under individual rating.
Proof. In a full support SIE, for each i = 1;:::;N, we must have the indi®erence













Under MRR2, q(m) is decreasing but frB(m)g stochastically dominates frB(m)g, so again
the inequality is true. Q.E.D.
Compared to individual rating, in decentralized rating each client i is exposed to a
greater risk when Si = G because of the uncertainty regarding the ratings of other clients.
However, the beliefs are more favorable under G than under B in the sense of ¯rst order
stochastic dominance. Thus, welfare improves so long as the agency is not too much less
risk-averse when Si = G than when Si = B.
27Since the strategy space in decentralized rating is the same as in individual rating,
the above results show that the gains in credibility and welfare in decentralized rating
come from sharing ratings information among the markets. We expect that the gains
are larger when the correlation is stronger. Indeed, the next proposition establishes that
when the correlation across client qualities is almost perfect, there is a limit in°ationary
equilibrium with \truth-telling," i.e., the equilibrium probability of in°ation converges to
0. Let f¼k
0;:::;¼k




n = 0; and (ii) limk!1 ¼k
N=(¼k
N +¼k
0) < q¤. The ¯rst condition means
that the states become almost perfectly positively correlated as k becomes arbitrarily large.
The second condition guarantees that there exists no pooling equilibrium with p(N;n) = 1
for all n when k is large.
Proposition 5.4. Under decentralized rating, truth-telling is a limit SIE when k goes to
in¯nity.
Proof. Equation (4.2) is necessary and su±cient for an SIE under decentralized rating.
As in the proof of Proposition 4.3, for p = 0, the left-hand-side of (4.2) is strictly larger
than the right-hand-side for any k. Next, for all p > 0, the limit of left-hand-side as k goes
to in¯nity is strictly less than
pN¡1U(B;g;1) + (1 ¡ pN¡1)U(B;g;0):
This is because in the limit when the correlation is perfect, from equation (4.1) we have
q(m) = 0 for all m < N, while q(N) < 1. Let ~ p be the value of p that solves
pN¡1U(B;g;1) + (1 ¡ pN¡1)U(B;g;0) = U(B;b;0):
Then, for all 0 < p < ~ p, the limit of the left-hand-side of (4.2) as k goes to in¯nity is
strictly smaller than the right-hand-side. Hence, for each p there exists k(p) such that
for all k > k(p) there is an SIE with the probability of in°ation strictly between 0 and p.
Since this construction of ~ p and k(p) holds for all p, by taking p arbitrarily close to 0, we
can establish truth-telling (i.e., p = 0) as a limit point of a sequence of SIE's for k going
to in¯nity. Q.E.D.
28While strong correlation enhances credibility and improves welfare in decentralized
rating, the opposite is true in centralized rating. To see this, note that the conditions
made on the convergence of the sequence of the distributions ¼k imply that in the limit
of k ! 1, there is no strict TIE by Proposition 3.7. Thus, centralized rating cannot
improve upon individual rating when correlation is almost perfect. Correlation of the
underlying qualities reduces the manipulation room both under decentralized rating and
under centralized rating. Under decentralized rating the constraint imposed by correlation
makes it harder for a rater to fool the market with a good rating, and forces the individual
raters to tone down the exaggeration. This then results in a greater ex ante payo® relative
to individual rating. In contrast, strong correlation makes correlated randomization under
centralized rating less e®ective.
In Proposition 5.4 we have considered only the limit case of perfect positive correlation.
For the model of N = 2, ¼0 = ¼2 = 1
2½ and ¼1 = 1 ¡ ½ for some ½ 2 (0;1), and q¤ > 1
2,
perfect negative correlation is well-de¯ned. Under decentralized rating, there is unique SIE
with negative correlation (½ < 1
2). As ½ converges to 0, the equilibrium converges to truth-
telling, with p = 0. Under centralized rating, when ½ is su±ciently small (precisely, when
½ < 2(1¡q¤)=(2q¤ ¡1)), the unique TIE has l = 1, p(1;1) = 1, and p(1;0);p(2;0) > 0. As
½ decreases, p(1;0) increases and p(2;0) decreases. In the limit as ½ converges to 0, both
p(1;0) and p(2;0) are strictly positive, so the limit equilibrium strategy is not truth-telling.
However, the ex ante payo® of the agency in the limit TIE is the same as in truth-telling.
For analysis involving non-extreme values of correlation, the notion of the \degree of
dependence" is ambiguous, and a more speci¯c description of the multivariate probability
process is required. We illustrate how the degree of dependence a®ects the welfare prop-
erties of centralized rating versus decentralized rating using the probability distribution








i=0 (¼ + i°)¦
N¡n¡1
i=0 (1 ¡ ¼ + i°)
¦
N¡1
i=0 (1 + i°)
;
where ° ¸ ¡(N ¡1)¡1 minf¼;1¡¼g. This probability mass function is fairly general as it
encompasses four classes of probability distributions: (i) beta-binomial; (ii) binomial; (iii)
hypergeometric; and (iv) Polya-Eggenberger distribution. It satis¯es MTP2 when ° > 0
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and satis¯es MRR2 when ° < 0. For this distribution, Joe (1997) shows that E[Yi] = ¼ and
cor(Yi;Yj) = (1+°¡1)¡1. Therefore, the higher the absolute value of °, the greater is the
degree of (positive or negative) dependence among the qualities of di®erent clients. We use
this distribution, with N = 10 and ¼ = 0:5, to calculate the TIE's under centralized rating
and the SIE's under decentralized rating for di®erent degrees of dependence.8 Figure 1
shows the ex ante welfare for the rating agency under the two scenarios for di®erent values
of °, for payo® functions U(G;g;q) = 1+q, U(B;b;q) = 0:8(1+q), U(G;b;q) = 0:6(1+q)
and U(B;g;q) = 0:5(1+q). For centralized rating, equilibrium threshold decreases weakly
with °. When the correlation is about zero, there is a TIE with threshold l = 4. When
° > 0:61, the only TIE is the full support equilibrium (l = 0) with payo® equal to that
under individual rating. For decentralized rating, equilibrium probability of in°ation is at
a maximum when ° = 0, and decreases monotonically as ° becomes either more positive
or more negative. In the ¯gure, centralized rating dominates decentralized rating for all
° < 0:56.
8 When N > 2, the maximum degree of negative correlation among a group of exchangeable binary
random variables is bounded away from ¡1. In our probability distribution with N = 10 and ¼ = 0:5, the
maximum degree of negative correlation is approximately ¡0:059. We cannot compare centralized rating
with decentralized rating beyond this degree of negative correlation.
306. Concluding Remarks
Providers of information often care about the way their information is used. The desire
to create favorable beliefs about its clients may cause the rating agency to in°ate its
assessment of the quality of its clients. The exuberant stock recommendations made during
the internet boom, and the failure of auditors to raise alerts in a number of recent corporate
scandals have heightened the public's concern about the potential con°ict of interests
inherent in situations where raters are advocates for the rated. Moore et al. (2005)
study these kind of problems and their possible solutions from a variety of perspectives.
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) study how competition and the concern for reputation may
constrain biased reporting by the mass media. Chan, Li and Suen (2005) use a signaling
model to understand why grades in academia tend to be exaggerated. None of these
papers, however, examines how the credibility of ratings can be improved by coordinating
or decentralizing the rating decisions, which is the main focus of our paper.
In the literature on reputational cheap talk, a bad sender type may provide useful in-
formation to the receiver to establish the credibility as a good sender type so as to extract
future surplus (Sobel 1985; Benabou and Laroque 1992; Morris, 2001; Morgan and Stock-
ton, 2003). This e®ect arises in a cheap talk game where the sender has private information
on both the relevant state-of-world and his personal bias. As a costly signaling model of
credibility, our model of individual rating has a single source of private information. The
equilibrium credibility of a good rating is quanti¯able in our model and corresponds one-
to-one with the welfare of the rating agency. These features make our model of credibility
a natural benchmark for comparisons with centralized and decentralized rating schemes.
This paper is related to the small literature on multi-dimensional signaling (Quinzii
and Rochet, 1985; Engers, 1987). This literature focuses on the conditions under which
separation of types occurs. Technically, the models in the existing literature are concerned
with multi-dimensional private information for the sender and one-dimensional signals.
Our signaling model of centralized rating assumes exchangeability of the components of
the state vector, so that the private information is the number of good clients, which is
one-dimensional. However, the signal space is multi-dimensional, as a strategy speci¯es
31a number of good ratings for each number of good clients. As a result, the single cross-
ing condition in the benchmark case of individual rating is not completely e®ective in
either centralized rating or decentralized rating. This feature complicates the analysis but
enriches the comparison analysis for the di®erent schemes of rating. Chakraborty and Har-
baugh (forthcoming) show that in a cheap talk game where a send and a receiver interact
on several unrelated issues, the sender can credibly communicate to the receiver the rank-
ing of the private signals even if the con°icts between them are too great to permit credible
communication of the signal on any single issue. Their result has the interpretation that
bundling independent reports may help information transmission, which is related to our
result for centralized rating. However, their result follows from the observation that the
sender has no incentive to deceive the receiver about the ranking of the signals, while our
analysis is based on coordination of the reports in a costly signaling model.
In the signaling literature, there are existing models that involve multiple senders
(Bagwell and Ramsey, 1991; Hertzendorf and Overgaard, 2001). In these models, the
senders know each other's types and interact with each other directly through their signals.
In contrast, the raters in our model of decentralized rating have private information about
their own private types and have no direct interaction except that their signals are jointly
used by the receivers to make inference about the types of the senders. Our model is
therefore a model of competing signals, rather than a model of competing senders.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.4. First, since W(m;0) < W(0;0) if q(m) < q¤, there exists some
m ¸ l such that q(m) ¸ q¤.
Next, we claim that q(m) ¸ q¤ for all m ¸ l: Suppose not, and let m ¸ l be the lowest
m such that q(m) < q¤: If q(m0) ¸ q¤ for some m0 > m then W(m0;n) > W(m;n) for all
n · n, contradicting the assumption of TIE with threshold l. If q(m) < q¤ for all m > m,
we must have q(m¡1) ¸ q¤: Then, for any n · m¡1, W(m¡1;n) > W(m;n) and hence
p(m;n) = 0. Thus, either m is not in the support of the equilibrium strategy or q(m) = 1,
a contradiction in either case.
32Next, we claim that q(m) ¸ q(m+1) for all m ¸ l. Suppose instead q(m) < q(m+1).
Then q(m + 1) > q¤ and for all n · m we have W(m + 1;n) ¡ W(m;n) > 0, so that m is
not in the support of the equilibrium strategy, a contradiction.
Next, we claim that q(m) = q(m+1) for some m ¸ l implies that q(m) = q¤. Suppose
instead q(m) = q(m + 1) > q¤. Then for all n · m we have W(m + 1;n) ¡ W(m;n) > 0,
so that m is not in the support of the equilibrium strategy, a contradiction.
Finally, we claim that q(m) > q(m+1) for some m ¸ l implies q(m+1) > q¤. Suppose
instead q(m) > q(m+1) = q¤. Then W(m;0)¡W(m+1;0) > 0. By Lemma 3.2, we have
W(m;n) ¡ W(m + 1;n) > 0 for all n · m. Thus, either m + 1 is not in the support of
the equilibrium strategy, or q(m + 1) = 1, a contradiction to the assumption of TIE with
threshold l in either case. The lemma follows immediately. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. First, consider the out-of-equilibrium belief ^ q(0). By Lemma
3.5, p(N;0) > 0 in any TIE. For any n > 0, by Lemma 3.2, if W(0;n) ¸ W(N;n) then
W(0;0) > W(N;0). By optimality we have W(tn;n) ¸ W(N;n). Thus, W(0;n) ¸
W(tn;n) implies that W(0;0) > W(N;0). It follows from the re¯nement that ^ q(0) = 0.
Next, consider the out-of-equilibrium beliefs ^ q(m) for any m = f1;:::;l ¡ 1g. Since
tn · tm for any n · l, by Lemma 3.2 if W(m;n) ¸ W(tm;n) then W(m;m) > W(tm;m).
By optimality W(tn;n) ¸ W(tm;n). Thus, W(m;n) ¸ W(tn;n) implies W(m;m) >
W(tm;m). For any n > l, suppose that W(m;n) ¸ W(tn;n). Then, W(m;n) > W(l;n),
and the di®erence between W(m;l) ¡ W(l;l) and W(m;n) ¡ W(l;n) is (n ¡ l) times
[U(B;b; ^ q(m)) ¡ U(B;b;0)] ¡ [U(G;b; ^ q(m)) ¡ U(G;b;0)];
which is non-negative by Assumption 2. Thus, W(m;n) ¸ W(tn;n) implies W(m;l) >
W(l;l). Combining these two cases, we have ^ q(m) = 0.
Finally, given that ^ q(m) = 0, for any n < m,
W(m;n) ¡ W(tm;n) = n[U(G;g;q(m)) ¡ U(G;g;q(tm))]
+ (m ¡ n)[U(B;g;q(m)) ¡ U(B;g;q(tm))] + (tm ¡ m)[U(B;b;0) ¡ U(B;g;q(tm))]:
Since q(tm) > q¤, if W(m;n) ¸ W(tm;n) then q(m) > q(tm), which by Lemma 3.2 implies
that W(m;m) > W(tm;m). By optimality we have W(tn;n) ¸ W(tm;n). Therefore,
33W(m;n) ¸ W(tn;n) implies that W(m;m) > W(tm;m). It follows from the re¯nement
that q(m) = 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.7. Step 0. Consider the following full-support TIE with l = 0.
Assign p(n;n) = 1 for all n > 0; it remains to assign p(n;0). Let the only component of the
path variable P0 be p(0;0). Start the algorithm at p(0;0) = 1, and continuously decrease
it to 0. For each p(0;0) 2 [0;1], let p(n;0) be such that W(n;0) = W(0;0). De¯ne ¾ as
PN
n=0 p(n;0), which is a function of P0.
Step l, with l < N. Consider a strict TIE with l. We have p(n;n) = 1 for all n > l,
and p(m;n) = 0 for m < l and n · l, and we need to assign p(m;n) for all m ¸ l and
n · l. Let the ¯rst component of the path variable Pl be p(l;l). Fix any p(l;l) 2 [0;1] and
decrease it continuously, starting from 1. For each n = l + 1;:::;N ¡ 1, de¯ne iteratively
p(n;l) as the minimum of 1¡
P
k<n p(k;l) and the value such that W(n;l) = W(l;l), where
q(n) and q(l) are calculated under the assumption that all probability numbers yet to be
assigned are zero. Let p(N;l) = 1 ¡
P
k<N p(k;l). Note that by construction p(n;l) ¸ 0
for all n. Next, we iteratively assign values to p(m;n) for n < l and m ¸ l. Suppose
that for each j < l, the probability numbers p(m;n) have been assigned for all m ¸ l and
n > j, and denote the current path variable as Pl. Let n(j +1) = minfn : p(n;j +1)g > 0
and n(j + 1) = maxfn : p(n;j + 1)g > 0. Assign p(m;j) = 0 for all m < n(j + 1), and
consider assigning the remaining probability numbers p(m;j) for m ¸ n(j +1). There are
¯ve cases. In each case, at every point in the algorithm, the beliefs are computed under
the assumption that all probability numbers yet to be assigned are zero.
(i) N > n(j+1) > n(j+1) and W(n(j+1);j+1) > W(n(j+1);j+1). In this case, let
p(n(j +1);j) be the minimum of 1 and the value such that W(n(j +1);j +1) = W(n(j +
1);j+1). (If j = 0, let p(n(1);0) be such that W(n(1);1) = W(n(1);1).) For each n strictly
between n(j +1) and N, de¯ne iteratively p(n;j) as the minimum of 1¡
P
k<n p(k;j) and
the value such that W(n;j) = W(n(j + 1);j), and let p(N;j) = 1 ¡
P
k<N p(k;j). (If
j = 0, let p(n;0) be the value such that W(n;0) = W(n(1);0) for all n > n(1).) Retain
the same path variable Pl.
(ii) N > n(j+1) > n(j+1) and W(n(j+1);j+1) = W(n(j+1);j+1). In this case, let
p(n(j +1);j) = 0. If n(j +1) = N ¡1, let p(N;j) = 1. Otherwise, we can use Lemma 3.2
34to verify that the value of p(n(j +1)+1;j) that solves W(n(j +1);j) = W(n(j +1)+1;j)
is greater than the value that solves W(n(j + 1);j + 1) = W(n(j + 1) + 1;j + 1). Let
p(n(j + 1) + 1;j) decrease from the minimum of 1 and the ¯rst value to the minimum of
1 and the second value. (If j = 0, let p(n(1) + 1;0) decrease from the value that solves
W(n(1);0) = W(n(1) + 1;0). to the value that solves W(n(1);1) = W(n(1) + 1;1).)
At this point, the algorithm continues with p(n(j + 1) + 1;j) being the last component
of the path variable Pl. We then assign each probability p(n;j), for n strictly between
n(j + 1) + 1 and N, with the minimum of 1 ¡
P
k<n p(k;j) and the value such that
W(n;j) = W(n(j +1)+1;j). Let p(N;j) = 1¡
P
k<N p(k;j). (If j = 0, let p(n;0) be the
value such that W(n;0) = W(n(1) + 1;0) for all n > n(1) + 1.)
(iii) N > n(j + 1) = n(j + 1) = l. Let p(n(j + 1);j) decrease from the minimum of 1
and the value that solves W(l;l¡1) = W(l¡1;l¡1), to 0. (If j = 0, let p(n(1);0) decrease
from the value that solves W(l;l¡1) = W(l¡1;l¡1), to 0.) At this point, the algorithm
continues with p(n(j + 1);j) being the last component of the path variable Pl. We then
assign each probability p(n;j), for n strictly between n(j + 1) and N, with the minimum
of 1 ¡
P
k<n p(k;j) and the value such that W(n;j) = W(n(j + 1);j). Let p(N;j) =
1¡
P
k<N p(k;j). (If j = 0, let p(n;0) be the value such that W(n;0) = W(n(1);0) for all
n > n(1).)
(iv) N > n(j + 1) = n(j + 1) > l. De¯ne t = minfn : p(n(j + 1) ¡ 1;n) > 0g
and t = maxfn : p(n(j + 1);n) > 0g. Let p(n(j + 1);j) decrease from the minimum of
1 and the value that solves W(n(j + 1);t) = W(n(j + 1) ¡ 1;t). to the minimum of 1
and the value that solves W(n(j + 1);t) = W(n(j + 1) ¡ 1;t). (If j = 0, let p(n(1);0)
decrease from the value that solves W(n(1);t) = W(n(1) ¡ 1;t) to the value that solves
W(n(1);t) = W(n(1) ¡ 1;t).) At this point, the algorithm continues with p(n(j + 1);j)
being the last component of the path variable Pl. We then assign each probability p(n;j),
for n strictly between n(j+1) and N, with the minimum of 1¡
P
k<n p(k;j) and the value
such that W(n;j) = W(n(j + 1);j). Let p(N;j) = 1 ¡
P
k<N p(k;j). (If j = 0, let p(n;0)
be the value such that W(n;0) = W(n(1);0) for all n > n(1).)
(v) n(j + 1) = N. In this case, let p(N;j) = 1. (If j = 0 and n(1) = N, p(N;0) is
assigned as in case (iv) above.) Retain the same path variable Pl.
35Iterating the above procedure determines all probability numbers p(m;n) for m ¸ l
and n · l. The algorithm then assigns a value to ¾, which is
PN
n=0 p(n;0), as a function of
the path variable Pl. Note that the path variable is uni-directional along the algorithm. We
claim that as the path variable Pl decreases the value of ¾ strictly decreases continuously.
This can be shown by induction. Clearly, in step 0 the function ¾ decreases continuously
as the path variable P0 decreases. At the end point of step 0, we have p(0;0) = 0,
p(1;1) = 1, and p(1;0) is such that W(0;0) = W(1;0). At the starting point of step 1,
we have p(1;1) = 1 and case (iii) above applies, which implies that p(1;0) is such that
W(0;0) = W(1;0). Thus, the function ¾ is continuous when we move from step 0 to step
1. Within step 1, for a given value of p(1;1), either case (i) above applies and the path
variable P1 is p(1;1), or cases (ii) to (v) apply and the path variable is p(1;1) together
with p(n;0) for some n ¸ 1. We can thus partition the entire path in step 1 into intervals,
such that for each interval the path variable is either p(1;1), or p(1;1) and p(n;0) for
some n ¸ 1 and p(n;0) within some range [p(n;0);p(n;0)] determined by the algorithm.
The function ¾ is clearly continuous and strictly decreasing in the path variable within
each interval. Moreover, for each interval where the path variable is ~ p(1;1) together with
p(n;0) 2 [p(n;0);p(n;0)], we can verify that limp(1;1)"~ p(1;1) ¾(P1) = limp(n;0)#p(n;0) ¾(P1)
and limp(1;1)#~ p(1;1) ¾(P1) = limp(n;0)"p(n;0) ¾(P1), so that ¾ is continuous at boundary
points. Repeating this argument for each step l establishes continuity and monotonicity
of the algorithm.
Finally, in step 0, when P0 = 1, we have ¾ > 1. If ¾ > 1 at the end of step N ¡ 1,
then there is a TIE with threshold l = N. Otherwise, there is a unique value ^ Pl such
that ¾( ^ Pl) = 1, and the probability numbers generated by the algorithm at ^ Pl constitute
a TIE with threshold l. Further, if l > 0 at ^ Pl, the equilibrium has q(l) > q¤; otherwise,
the equilibrium has q(m) = q¤ for all m. Finally, since every strict TIE corresponds to
a distinct value of the path variable in the algorithm where the value of ¾ equals 1, the
equilibrium with l > 0 and q(l) > q¤ is unique when it exists. The necessary and su±cient
condition for the existence of an equilibrium with l > 0 and q(l) > q¤ is ¾ > 1 at P0 = 0,
which is equivalent to q¤ < 1 ¡ ¼0. Q.E.D.
































(m + 1 ¡ n)!n!
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:
The above expression is a polynomial of 1=p, of order (2m + 1). The constant in the








(m + 1 ¡ k + n)!(k ¡ n ¡ 1)!
¡ (m + 1)
fn
(m + 1 ¡ n)!n!
fk¡n
(m ¡ k + n)!(k ¡ n ¡ 1)!
´
:
We will show that the above coe±cient is positive for each k under MTP2 and negative
under MRR2. To see this, note that the above sum is of the form
Pk¤
n=0 cnfnfk¡n, where




m!(m ¡ k + 1)!(k ¡ 1)!
:
For each n = 1;:::;k¤ ¡ 1, note that there are four terms of fnfk¡n in the above sum, so
adding them up we have
cn =
(m + 1)((k ¡ n)(k ¡ n ¡ 1) + n(n ¡ 1)) ¡ 2mn(k ¡ n)
n!(m + 1 ¡ n)!(m + 1 ¡ k + n)!(k ¡ n)!
:
Moreover, ck¤ is given by an identical formula with n = k¤ if k is odd, and is given by the
same formula divided by 2 if k is even. By direct manipulations, we can show that each
cn for n = 1;:::;k¤ ¡ 1, and ck¤ when k is odd, can be decomposed into two terms
cn =
k ¡ 2n ¡ 1
(m ¡ n)!n!(m ¡ k + n + 1)!(k ¡ n ¡ 1)!
¡
k ¡ 2(n ¡ 1) ¡ 1
(m ¡ n + 1)!(n ¡ 1)!(m ¡ k + n)!(k ¡ n)!
:
37For k even, we have
ck¤ = ¡
1
(m ¡ k=2 + 1)!(k=2 ¡ 1)!(m ¡ k=2)!(k=2)!
:
Note that the second part of c1 is equal to c0; for each n = 1;:::;k¤ ¡ 1, the ¯rst part
of cn is equal to the second part of cn+1; the ¯rst part of ck¤ is 0. It follows that we can




for some ®n > 0, n = 0;:::;k¤ ¡1. By Fact 2, the coe±cient of each p¡k is positive under
MTP2 and negative under MRR2. The case of k ¸ m + 1 can be established in a similar
fashion. Q.E.D.
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